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Political-economic determinants of education reform: Evidence on interest groups and student outcomes

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  • Fabella, Vigile Marie

Abstract

Education reforms come in two general types: access and quality reforms. Access reforms provide more educational opportunities, while quality reforms improve educational effectiveness. This paper investigates empirically the factors affecting the enactment of these two kinds of reforms in public primary and secondary education. By using a novel dataset of U.S. state legislation from 2008 to 2013, we find that both access and quality reforms are more likely in times of bad educational outcomes. Moreover, this is the first study documenting that teachers' union strength correlates positively with access reforms and negatively with quality reforms. Our results also shed light on the way teachers' unions promote their political interests: both lobbying and contributions are effective at opposing undesired reforms, but contributions have an extra effect of influencing the enactment of desired reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabella, Vigile Marie, 2017. "Political-economic determinants of education reform: Evidence on interest groups and student outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 144-161.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:48:y:2017:i:c:p:144-161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023. "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2020. "Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power," IZA Discussion Papers 13924, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Wagner, Gary A. & Elder, Erick M., 2021. "Campaigning for retirement: State teacher union campaign contributions and pension generosity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    4. Busemeyer, Marius R. & Lergetporer, Philipp & Woessmann, Ludger, 2018. "Public opinion and the political economy of educational reforms: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 161-185.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political economy; Education; Reform; Interest groups; Access; Quality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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