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Choosing the size of the public sector under rent seeking from state coffers

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  • Park, Hyun
  • Philippopoulos, Apostolis
  • Vassilatos, Vanghelis
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 21 (2005)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 830-850

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:21:y:2005:i:4:p:830-850

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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    1. Pierre-Daniel G. Sarte, 1999. "Informality and rent-seeking bureaucracies in a model of long-run growth," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 99-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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    7. Rodrik, Dani, 1998. "Where Did all the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict and Growth Collapses," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    19. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides, 2005. "Rent Seeking, Policy and Growth under Electoral Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence," DEGIT Conference Papers, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade c010_029, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
    20. Nancy L. Stokey & Sergio Rebelo, 1993. "Growth Effects of Flat-Rate Taxes," NBER Working Papers 4426, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    35. Grossman, Herschel I. & Mendoza, Juan, 2003. "Scarcity and appropriative competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 747-758, November.
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    Cited by:
    1. Aleksandar Vasilev, 2013. "On the cost of rent-seeking by government bureaucrats in a Real-Business-Cycle framework," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 2013_20, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    2. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2007. "The growth effects of fiscal policy in Greece 1960–2000," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 157-175, April.
    3. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 2009. "The social cost of rent seeking in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 280-299, September.
    4. Bohn, Frank, 2007. "Polarisation, uncertainty and public investment failure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1077-1087, December.
    5. Iqbal, Nasir & Daly, Vince, 2014. "Rent seeking opportunities and economic growth in transitional economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 16-22.
    6. François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal Government Size and Economic Growth in France (1871-2008): An explanation by the State and Market Failures," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2006. "Rent-Seeking Competition from State Coffers: A Calibrated DSGE Model of the Euro Area," CESifo Working Paper Series 1644, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent Seeking and the Excess Burden of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 8160, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Romero-Ávila, Diego & Usabiaga, Carlos, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 205-231.
    10. Van Long, Ngo, 2013. "The theory of contests: A unified model and review of the literature," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 161-181.
    11. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2007. "Rent-seeking competition from state coffers in a calibrated DSGE model of the euro area," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 2007_29, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.

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