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Rent dissipation and social benefit in regulated entry contests

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  • Lee, Sanghack
  • Cheong, Kiwoong

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  • Lee, Sanghack & Cheong, Kiwoong, 2005. "Rent dissipation and social benefit in regulated entry contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 205-219, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:21:y:2005:i:1:p:205-219
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    1. Poitras, Marc & Sutter, Daniel, 2000. "Enhancing Efficiency or Crying Over Spilled Milk: The Benefits of Reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 23-40, October.
    2. Kang, Jae Hyeong & Lee, Sanghack, 2001. "The social cost of entry contest in Cournot-Nash oligopoly," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 139-152.
    3. Rasmusen, Eric B & Zupan, Mark A, 1991. "Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 167-191, December.
    4. Lee, Sanghack, 1995. "Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-Group Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(1-2), pages 31-44, October.
    5. John H. Nachbar & Bruce C. Petersen & Inhak Hwang, 1998. "Sunk Costs, Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 317-332, September.
    6. Nachbar, John H & Petersen, Bruce C & Hwang, Inhak, 1998. "Sunk Costs, Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 317-332, September.
    7. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    8. Ellingsen, Tore, 1991. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 648-657, June.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1991. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(409), pages 1522-1534, November.
    10. Sanghack Lee, 1993. "Inter-group competition for a pure private rent," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 261-266.
    11. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Lee, Sanghack, 2000. "Two-Stage Rent-Seeking Contests with Carryovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 285-296, June.
    12. Poitras, Marc & Sutter, Daniel, 1997. "The Efficiency Gains from Deregulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 81-89, July.
    13. McCormick, Robert E & Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1984. "The Disinterest in Deregulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 1075-1079, December.
    14. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    15. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
    16. Wenders, John T, 1987. "On Perfect Rent Dissipation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 456-459, June.
    17. Berry, S Keith, 1993. "Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 437-443, October.
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    1. Kräkel, Matthias, 2012. "Competitive careers as a way to mediocracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 76-87.
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    3. Raúl Bajo‐Buenestado, 2023. "Efficient regulated entry in competitive markets with demand uncertainty," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(2), pages 413-422, June.

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