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Sunk Costs, Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry

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Author Info

  • Sachbar, J.H.
  • Peterson, B.C.
  • Hwang, I.

Abstract

Although economists usually support the unrestricted entry of firms into an industry, entry may lower welfare if there are setup costs or if entrants have a cost disadvantage. We consider the welfare effects of entry within a standard Cornot model where some of an incumbent firm's costs are sunk.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in its series Washington University with number 97-03.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:wablec:97-03

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/
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Keywords: ENTERPRISES ; SUNK COSTS;

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Cited by:
  1. Manuel Willington & FabiĆ”n Basso, 2006. "RegulaciĆ³n, Cobertura y Competencia en el Mercado de la Banda Ancha," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv177, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  2. T.W. Ross, 2004. "Sunk Costs and the Entry Decision," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 79-93, 06.
  3. Lee, Sanghack & Cheong, Kiwoong, 2005. "Rent dissipation and social benefit in regulated entry contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 205-219, March.
  4. L. Lambertini & G. Rossini, 2000. "Excess Capacity in Oligopoly with Sequential Entry," Working Papers 384, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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