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Regulación, Cobertura y Competencia en el Mercado de la Banda Ancha

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Author Info
Manuel Willington () (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)
Fabián Basso () (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

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Abstract

En los últimos años, se han desarrollado una variedad de tecnologías alternativas que han permitido cambiar las características tecnológicas del mercado de las telecomunicaciones disminuyendo costos de almacenamiento y procesamiento de información lo cual permite digitalizar muchos servicios de telecomunicaciones. Al igual que en el caso de la telefonía, el costo de proveer acceso de Banda Ancha es mayor en áreas geográfica de baja densidad poblacional. Frente a esto es económicamente eficiente cobrar precios mayores en las zonas más costosas que comúnmente suelen ser áreas rurales. Esto último resulta políticamente inviable dando origen a la tarificación uniforme y al esquema de subsidios cruzados. Por otra parte el tema del “acceso universal” ha cobrado gran de interés entre los reguladores de cada nación. Pero precisamente unos requerimientos de precios uniformes van en desmedro de una mayor cobertura geográfica. Este trabajo intenta evaluar la optimalidad de una política de precios totalmente uniformes, parcialmente uniformes y precios libres cuando el regulador tiene por objetivo metas de masificación o acceso universal en mercados geográficamente distintos que difieren en su densidad poblacional y en el cual existe la posibilidad de otorgar ventaja a una firma en su decisión de cobertura. La aplicación de un esquema de precios parcialmente uniformes unido a la ventaja estratégica en la elección de cobertura permite hallar un resultado de alcance o cobertura geográfica superior al de un esquema de precios totalmente uniformes en que se mantiene la secuencialidad de entrada de las firmas e incluso superior al que hallaría un regulador que fija ex-ante simultáneamente cobertura para que posteriormente las firmas compitan simultáneamente en cantidad.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv177.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv177

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Related research
Keywords: Precios Uniformes; Cobertura; Banda Ancha;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hoernig, Steffen & Pita Barros, Pedro Luis & Valletti, Tommaso, 2001. "Universal Service and Entry: the Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 2789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Foros, Oystein & Kind, Hans Jarle, 2003. "The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 215-35, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sachbar, J.H. & Peterson, B.C. & Hwang, I., 1997. "Sunk Costs, Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry," Washington University 97-03, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.
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  4. Valletti, Tommaso M., 2000. "Introduction: Symposium on universal service obligation and competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 205-210, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Faulhaber, Gerald R & Hogendorn, Christiaan, 2000. "The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(3), pages 305-29, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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