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The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock

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  • Dur, Robert A. J.
  • Swank, Otto H.

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  • Dur, Robert A. J. & Swank, Otto H., 1998. "The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 561-572, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:3:p:561-572
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    1. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 663-688.
    2. Haggard, Stephan & Webb, Steven B, 1993. "What Do We Know about the Political Economy of Economic Policy Reform?," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 8(2), pages 143-168, July.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    4. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    5. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    6. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
    7. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    8. Peter Bernholz, 1973. "Logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 87-95, June.
    9. Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Partisan Policies, Macroeconomic Performance and Political Support," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 367-386, April.
    10. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    11. Robert A.J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 1997. "On the Role of the Governmental Agreement in Breaking Political Deadlocks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-023/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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