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Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

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  • Andersson, Tommy
  • Svensson, Lars-Gunnar

Abstract

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 56 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 350-354

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:3:p:350-354

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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Keywords: Indivisibles Fairness Coalitionally strategy-proofness;

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References

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  1. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
  2. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1991. "No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1755-67, November.
  3. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1985. "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 873-88, July.
  4. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
  5. Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2003. "A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 73-79, October.
  6. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1983. "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 939-54, July.
  7. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2003. "A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism," Working Papers 346, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar, 2010. "Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability," Cahiers de recherche 18-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Paula Jaramillo & Çagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2012. "Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint," Working Papers 610, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities," Working Papers 2012:8, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 30 Sep 2013.
  5. Tommy Andersson, 2009. "A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1717-1722.
  6. Andersson, T. & Gudmundsson, J. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2013. "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Discussion Paper 2013-008, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control," Working Papers 2012:18, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 10 Jun 2013.
  8. Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2012. "Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 113-133, February.
  9. Andersson, Tommy & Andersson, Christer & Talman, Adolphus Johannes Jan, 2010. "Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders," Working Papers 2010:15, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Jun 2012.
  10. Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2009. "Solving House Allocation Problems with Risk-Averse Agents," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(4), pages 389-401, May.

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