Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
AbstractThe resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 50 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
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