Stakeholders in bilateral conflict

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Stakeholders in bilateral conflict

Author Info

Manzini, Paola
Ponsati, Clara

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 50 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 166-180
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:166-180

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Paper
- Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict," Game Theory and Information 0311008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(4), pages 619-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1993. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with "Externalities"," Discussion Paper Serie B 234, University of Bonn, Germany.
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
Other versions:
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Hendricks, Ken & Weiss, Andrew & Wilson, Charles A, 1988. "The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 663-80, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Weiss, Andrew & Wilson, Charles, 1987. "The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information," Working Papers 87-03, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
Paola Manzini & Clara Ponsati', 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," Game Theory and Information 0112001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Manzini, Paola & Ponsatí, Clara, 2001. "Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes," IZA Discussion Papers 395, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
Other versions:
- D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998. "Bargaining and Reputation," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
Bulow, Jeremy I & Klemperer, Paul, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1564, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1996. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1142, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," Game Theory and Information 9901004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1997. "The Generalized War of Attrition," NBER Working Papers 5872, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "The Generalized War of Attrition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 175-189, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
P. Manzini & C. Ponsati, 2006. "Stakeholder bargaining games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 67-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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