Monopoly regulation without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption
AbstractThe paper extends the Baron and Myerson [Baron, D., Myerson, R.B., 1982. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica 50, 911-930] model of monopoly regulation to bidimensional adverse selection: both the marginal cost and the fixed cost of the monopoly are unknown to the regulator. Like in Araujo and Moreira [Araujo, A., Moreira, H., 2000. Adverse section problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Fundação Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Ensaios Economicos 389], the paper provides an explicit solution of a screening model without the Spence-Mirrlees assumption.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 45 (2009)
Issue (Month): 9-10 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Spence-Mirrlees condition Adverse selection Regulation;
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