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Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard

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Author Info
Magill, Michael
Quinzii, Martine

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (September)
Pages: 149-190
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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:149-190

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  1. Calcagno, R. & Wagner, W., 2003. "The inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium under moral hazard," Discussion Paper 107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Wolf Wagner, 2007. "International Risk Sharing and Government Moral Hazard," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 577-598, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2005. "An Equilibrium Model of Managerial Compensation," IEPR Working Papers 05.22, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Matthias Blonski & Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal, 2008. "Excess Returns and the Distinguished Player Paradox," cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 78, cege – Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany)., revised 27 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Branko Urosevic, 2001. "Moral Hazard and Dynamics of Insider Ownership Stakes," Economics Working Papers 787, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  6. Quinzii, Martine & Magill, Michael, 2008. "Normative Properties of Stock Market Equilibrium with Moral Hazard," Working Papers 08-2, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Wagner, W., 2002. "Divestment, entrepreneurial incentives and the decision to go public," Discussion Paper 47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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