Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Michael Magill
• Martine Quinzii

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Annals of Finance.

Volume (Year): 2 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 407-420
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:2:y:2006:i:4:p:407-420

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=112370

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords: Optimal contracts; Reward increasing (decreasing) in other agents’ outcomes; Likelihood ratio and common shock; Effect of common shock on marginal product of effort; D82; G30; J33; M52;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Marco LiCalzi & Sandrine Spaeter, 2003. "Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 167-173, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
6. Marco Celentani & Rosa Loveira-Pazó, 2004. "What Form of Relative Performance Evaluation?," Economics Working Papers 744, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
7. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard, 1994. "The First-Order Approach to Multi-signal Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 459-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
9. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.