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Managerial Incentives in an Entrepreneurial Stock Market Model

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Richard E. Kihlstrom
Steven A. Matthews

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/876.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 876.

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Date of creation: Mar 1990
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:876

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  1. Alessandro, CITANNA & Archishman, CHAKRABORTY, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Aggregate Risk and Nominal Linear Financial Contracts," Les Cahiers de Recherche 683, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steven A. Matthews, 1991. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard," Discussion Papers 950, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Guglielmo Maria Caporale, & Peter G. A Howells, & Alaa M. Soliman,, 2003. "Endogenous growth and Stock Market Development," Discussion Papers 0302, University of the West of England, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Calcagno, R. & Wagner, W., 2003. "The inefficiency of the stock market equilibrium under moral hazard," Discussion Paper 107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Branko Urosevic, 2001. "Moral Hazard and Dynamics of Insider Ownership Stakes," Economics Working Papers 787, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
  6. James Dow & Gary Gorton, 1995. "Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?," NBER Working Papers 5233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Renegotiation of Sales Contracts," Discussion Papers 1051, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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