IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v93y2016icp99-114.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Clean money, dirty system: Connected landowners capture beneficial land rezoning

Author

Listed:
  • Murray, Cameron K.
  • Frijters, Paul

Abstract

We use a unique regulatory event that occurred in Queensland, Australia, from 2007 to 2012, to examine the predictive power of landowner relationship networks and lobbying behaviour on successfully gaining value-enhancing rezoning. A State authority, the Urban Land Development Authority (ULDA), took planning control away from local councils in selected areas in order to increase the speed and scale of development in those areas, in the process increasing land values. Using micro-level relationship data from multiple sources, we compare the relationship-network characteristics of landowners of comparable sites inside and outside the ULDA areas, finding that ‘connected’ landowners owned 75% of land inside the rezoned areas, and only 12% outside, capturing $410 million in land value gains out of the total $710 million from rezoning. We also find that engaging a professional lobbyist is a substitute for having one’s own connections. Scaling up from our sample of six rezoned areas to the hundreds of rezoning decisions across Queensland and Australia in the last few decades, suggests that many billions of dollars of economic rent are being regularly transferred from the general population to connected landowners through political rezoning decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul, 2016. "Clean money, dirty system: Connected landowners capture beneficial land rezoning," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 99-114.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:93:y:2016:i:c:p:99-114
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2016.04.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S009411901630002X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jue.2016.04.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chai, Sun-Ki & Rhee, Mooweon, 2010. "Confucian Capitalism and the Paradox of Closure and Structural Holes in East Asian Firms," Management and Organization Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 5-29, March.
    2. Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. & Maennig, Wolfgang, 2015. "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: A spatial analysis of airport effects," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 85-99.
    3. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2013. "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 42-56.
    4. Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2007. "On the political economy of zoning," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 25-49, February.
    5. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2013. "On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 29-43.
    6. Engle, Robert & Navarro, Peter & Carson, Richard, 1992. "On the theory of growth controls," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 269-283, November.
    7. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
    8. Katharina Schone & Wilfried Koch & Catherine Baumont, 2013. "Modeling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 95-117, January.
    9. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2012. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: Recent evidence from Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 10-19.
    10. Matthew O. Jackson & Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2012. "Social Capital and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 1857-1897, August.
    11. Amore, Mario Daniele & Bennedsen, Morten, 2013. "The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 387-402.
    12. Steven N. Durlauf, 2002. "On the Empirics of Social Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 459-479, November.
    13. Yan, Jia & Oum, Tae Hoon, 2014. "The effect of government corruption on the efficiency of US commercial airports," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 119-132.
    14. Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2015. "The Value of Connections: Evidence from the Italian†American Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 256-288, August.
    15. Joel Sobel, 2002. "Can We Trust Social Capital?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(1), pages 139-154, March.
    16. Dehring, Carolyn A. & Depken II, Craig A. & Ward, Michael R., 2008. "A direct test of the homevoter hypothesis," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 155-170, July.
    17. Simon Guy & John Henneberry, 2000. "Understanding Urban Development Processes: Integrating the Economic and the Social in Property Research," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 37(13), pages 2399-2416, December.
    18. Sun-Ki Chai & Mooweon Rhee, 2010. "Confucian Capitalism and the Paradox of Closure and Structural Holes in East Asian Firms," Management and Organization Review, The International Association for Chinese Management Research, vol. 6(1), pages 5-29, March.
    19. Grabowski, Richard, 2013. "The formation of growth coalitions: the role of the rural sector," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 329-350, September.
    20. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, 2013. "Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 19698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Chiodelli, 2019. "The illicit side of urban development: Corruption and organised crime in the field of urban planning," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 56(8), pages 1611-1627, June.
    2. Galletta, Sergio, 2017. "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 90-105.
    3. Christopher J Pettit & Scott Hawken & Carmela Ticzon & Simone Z Leao & Aida E Afrooz & Scott N Lieske & Tess Canfield & Hrishi Ballal & Carl Steinitz, 2019. "Breaking down the silos through geodesign – Envisioning Sydney’s urban future," Environment and Planning B, , vol. 46(8), pages 1387-1404, October.
    4. Twinam, Tate, 2018. "The long-run impact of zoning: Institutional hysteresis and durable capital in Seattle, 1920–2015," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 155-169.
    5. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Liu, Shouying & Xia, Fang, 2020. "Property rights reform to support China’s rural - urban integration: household-level evidence from the Chengdu experiment," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 64(1), January.
    6. Chris Gibson & Crystal Legacy & Dallas Rogers, 2023. "Deal-making, elite networks and public–private hybridisation: More-than-neoliberal urban governance," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 60(1), pages 183-199, January.
    7. Dallas Rogers & Chris Gibson, 2021. "Unsolicited urbanism: development monopolies, regulatory-technical fixes and planning-as-deal-making," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 53(3), pages 525-547, May.
    8. Cameron K. Murray, 2016. "Land value uplift from light rail," Discussion Papers Series 566, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    9. Shertzer, Allison & Twinam, Tate & Walsh, Randall P., 2018. "Zoning and the economic geography of cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 20-39.
    10. Cameron K. Murray, 2017. "Light Rail, Land Values and Taxes," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(302), pages 448-464, September.
    11. Murray, Cameron & Gordon, Josh, 2021. "Land as airspace: How rezoning privatizes public space (and why governments should not give it away for free)," OSF Preprints v89fg, Center for Open Science.
    12. Murray, Cameron, 2020. "Do political donations buy reputation in an elite gift-exchange game?," OSF Preprints fc9rt, Center for Open Science.
    13. Korthals Altes, Willem K., 2019. "Planning initiative: Promoting development by the use of options in Amsterdam," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 13-21.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Murray, Cameron K. & Frijters, Paul, 2015. "Clean Money in a Dirty System: Relationship Networks and Land Rezoning in Queensland," IZA Discussion Papers 9028, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2012. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: Recent evidence from Spain," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 10-19.
    3. Martin, Thorsten, 2017. "You shall not build! (until tomorrow) [:] Electoral cycles and housing policies in Germany," MPRA Paper 78998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Robert-Nicoud, Frédéric, 2013. "On the origins of land use regulations: Theory and evidence from US metro areas," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 29-43.
    5. Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López & Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2014. "Do Land Use Policies Follow Road Construction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4672, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Gyourko, Joseph & Molloy, Raven, 2015. "Regulation and Housing Supply," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1289-1337, Elsevier.
    7. Delattre, Laurence & Chanel, Olivier & Livenais, Cecile & Napoléone, Claude, 2015. "Combining discourse analyses to enrich theory: The case of local land-use policies in South Eastern France," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 60-75.
    8. Garcia-López, Miquel-Àngel & Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2015. "Does zoning follow highways?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 148-155.
    9. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2013. "The Influence Wielded by Land Developer Lobbies During the Housing Boom: Recent Evidence From Spain," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(2), pages 43-49, 07.
    10. Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López & Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2014. "Do Land Use Policies Follow Road Construction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4672, CESifo.
    11. Hilber, Christian A.L., 2010. "New housing supply and the dilution of social capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 419-437, May.
    12. Getahun Fenta Kebede, 2018. "Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Outcomes: Evidence from Informal Sector Entrepreneurs in Ethiopia," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Emerging Economies, Entrepreneurship Development Institute of India, vol. 27(2), pages 209-242, September.
    13. Dufhues, Thomas & Buchenrieder, Gertrud & Fischer, Isabel, 2006. "Social capital and rural development: literature review and current state of the art [Sozialkapital und ländliche Entwicklung: Literaturüberblick und gegenwärtiger Stand der Forschung]," IAMO Discussion Papers 96, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    14. Guillaume Chapelle & J.B. Eyméoud & C. Wolf, 2023. "Land-use regulation and housing supply elasticity: evidence from France," THEMA Working Papers 2023-08, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    15. Getahun Fenta Kebede, 2020. "Network Locations or Embedded Resources? The Effects of Entrepreneurs’ Social Networks on Informal Enterprise Performance in Ethiopia," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 11(2), pages 630-659, June.
    16. repec:zbw:iamodp:92017 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Matthias Wrede, 2022. "Voting on urban land development," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 335-359, March.
    18. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2019. "Housing booms and local spending," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    19. Solé-Ollé, Albert & Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet, 2013. "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 42-56.
    20. Christian A. L. Hilber & Olivier Schoni, 2022. "Housing policy and affordable housing," CEP Occasional Papers 56, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    21. Lang, Corey, 2018. "Assessing the efficiency of local open space provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 12-24.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; Social capital; Rezoning; Corruption; Lobbying;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:93:y:2016:i:c:p:99-114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622905 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.