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Allocating CO2 emission to customers on a distribution route

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  • Naber, S.K.
  • de Ree, D.A.
  • Spliet, R.
  • van den Heuvel, W.

Abstract

A logistics service provider often delivers goods to multiple customers on a single distribution route and emits CO2 while doing so. Since customers like to know the carbon footprint of products, they are interested in the amount of CO2 that is emitted as a result of their requested orders. Due to differences in location and order characteristics, it is not straightforward what share of the total emission each customer is responsible for. We consider the problem of allocating CO2 emission to each customer and model this problem as an emission allocation game. We use solution concepts from cooperative game theory to develop four emission allocation methods, and compare them to a fifth method based on common practice, referred to as the Star method. We apply all five allocation methods both to a case study and to randomly generated instances. We evaluate every method in terms of stability, consistency, robustness and computation time. Our computational results show that the Star method is outperformed on stability and robustness by the other allocation methods. In terms of consistency and computation time the Star method performs best, although in terms of consistency it is closely followed by other allocation methods. Finally, computation times are acceptable for all five allocation methods on all instances tested.

Suggested Citation

  • Naber, S.K. & de Ree, D.A. & Spliet, R. & van den Heuvel, W., 2015. "Allocating CO2 emission to customers on a distribution route," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 191-199.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:54:y:2015:i:c:p:191-199
    DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2015.01.017
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    Cited by:

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    5. M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro & I. García-Jurado & A. Meca & M. A. Mosquera, 2020. "On benefits of cooperation under strategic power," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 285-306, May.
    6. Dahlberg, Joen & Göthe-Lundgren, Maud & Engevall, Stefan, 2017. "A note on the nonuniqueness of the Equal Profit Method," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 308(C), pages 84-89.
    7. van Zon, M. & Spliet, R. & van den Heuvel, W., 2021. "The effect of algorithm capabilities on cooperative games," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI2021-02, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
    8. Kellner, Florian & Schneiderbauer, Miriam, 2019. "Further insights into the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions to shipments in road freight transportation: The pollution routing game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(1), pages 296-313.
    9. Florian Kellner, 2022. "Generating greenhouse gas cutting incentives when allocating carbon dioxide emissions to shipments in road freight transportation," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 44(3), pages 833-874, September.

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