IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/joepsy/v50y2015icp22-31.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intention to pay taxes or to avoid them: The impact of social value orientation

Author

Listed:
  • Brizi, Ambra
  • Giacomantonio, Mauro
  • Schumpe, Birga M.
  • Mannetti, Lucia

Abstract

Economic factors such as audit rates and fines have shown inconsistent effects on tax payments, suggesting that they are not sufficient to explain tax compliance. Moreover, the tax compliance rate is surprisingly higher than what the standard economic model would predict. In the last fifteen years, literature aimed at solving this so called “puzzle of compliance” has increased and pointed out several factors that could possibly explain tax compliance processes, e.g., knowledge of the tax laws, trust toward the political system, as well as personal or social norms. The studies presented here examined the impact of social value orientation on tax morale and intention to avoid/evade taxes. Social value orientation was examined both as a chronic personal orientation (Studies 1 and 2) and as a contextual factor made salient by experimental manipulations (Study 3). The results are supportive of a relationship between social value orientation and measures of tax compliance. Furthermore, results of Study 3 provided evidence for a causal effect of social value orientation on intended tax non-compliance. The effect of social value orientation on intended tax non-compliance was mediated by tax morale (Studies 2 and 3). Results are discussed with reference to their potential practical applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Brizi, Ambra & Giacomantonio, Mauro & Schumpe, Birga M. & Mannetti, Lucia, 2015. "Intention to pay taxes or to avoid them: The impact of social value orientation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:22-31
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.06.005
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487015000823
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.joep.2015.06.005?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Alm & Erich Kirchler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Katharina Gangl & Eva Hofmann & Christoph Kogler & Maria Pollai, 2012. "Rethinking the Research Paradigms for Analysing Tax Compliance Behaviour," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(02), pages 33-40, July.
    2. Braithwaite, Valerie & Ahmed, Eliza, 2005. "A threat to tax morale: The case of Australian higher education policy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 523-540, August.
    3. De Dreu, Carsten K. W. & Boles, Terry L., 1998. "Share and Share Alike or Winner Take All?: The Influence of Social Value Orientation upon Choice and Recall of Negotiation Heuristics, , ," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 253-276, December.
    4. Kirchler, Erich & Wahl, Ingrid, 2010. "Tax compliance inventory TAX-I: Designing an inventory for surveys of tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 331-346, June.
    5. Lars P. Feld & Friedrich Schneider, 2010. "Survey on the Shadow Economy and Undeclared Earnings in OECD Countries," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(2), pages 109-149, May.
    6. Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 89-103, March.
    7. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
    8. Elffers, Henk & Weigel, Russell H. & Hessing, Dick J., 1987. "The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 311-337, September.
    9. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1994. "Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    10. James Alm & Isabel Sanchez & Ana DE Juan, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 1-18, February.
    11. M Drouvelis & R Metcalfe & N Powdthavee, 2010. "Priming Cooperation in Social Dilemma Games," Discussion Papers 10/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
    12. Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Wahl, Ingrid, 2008. "Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 210-225, April.
    13. Lars P. Feld & Friedrich Schneider, 2010. "Survey on the Shadow Economy and Undeclared Earnings in OECD Countries," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(2), pages 109-149, May.
    14. Orviska, Marta & Hudson, John, 2003. "Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 83-102, March.
    15. Kastlunger, Barbara & Lozza, Edoardo & Kirchler, Erich & Schabmann, Alfred, 2013. "Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 36-45.
    16. Lubian, Diego & Zarri, Luca, 2011. "Happiness and tax morale: An empirical analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 223-243.
    17. Torgler, Benno & Demir, Ihsan C. & Macintyre, Alison & Schaffner, Markus, 2008. "Causes and Consequences of Tax Morale: An Empirical Investigation," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 313-339, September.
    18. James Alm, 2013. "A Convenient Truth: Property Taxes and Revenue Stability," Working Papers 1307, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    19. Robin Cubitt & Michalis Drouvelis & Simon Gächter, 2011. "Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 254-272, May.
    20. Holler, Marianne & Hoelzl, Erik & Kirchler, Erich & Leder, Susanne & Mannetti, Lucia, 2008. "Framing of information on the use of public finances, regulatory fit of recipients and tax compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 597-611, August.
    21. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
    22. Alm, James & Sanchez, Isabel & de Juan, Ana, 1995. "Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(1), pages 3-18.
    23. Wenzel, Michael, 2005. "Misperceptions of social norms about tax compliance: From theory to intervention," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 862-883, December.
    24. Kirchler,Erich, 2007. "The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876742.
    25. Gordon, James P. P., 1989. "Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 797-805, April.
    26. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    27. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
    28. Cullis, John & Jones, Philip & Savoia, Antonio, 2012. "Social norms and tax compliance: Framing the decision to pay tax," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 159-168.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cinzia Castiglioni & Edoardo Lozza & Eric Dijk & Wilco W. Dijk, 2019. "Two sides of the same coin? An investigation of the effects of frames on tax compliance and charitable giving," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 5(1), pages 1-10, December.
    2. Barile, Lory & Cullis, John & Philip Jones, 2022. "Aint that a Shame : False Tax Declarations and Fraudulent Benefit Claims," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1435, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Maciej A. Górecki & Natalia Letki, 2021. "Social Norms Moderate the Effect of Tax System on Tax Evasion: Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey Experiment," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 172(4), pages 727-746, September.
    4. Grosch, Kerstin & Ibañez, Marcela & Viceisza, Angelino, 2022. "Competition and prosociality: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Ghana," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    5. John W D’Attoma & Clara Volintiru & Antoine Malézieux, 0. "Gender, Social Value Orientation, and Tax Compliance," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 66(3), pages 265-284.
    6. Alexander, Phyllis & Balavac-Orlic, Merima, 2022. "Tax morale: Framing and fairness," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(1).
    7. Dylan Minor, 2016. "Risk Preferences and Misconduct: Evidence from Politicians," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-073, Harvard Business School.
    8. Emily M Thornton & Lara B Aknin & Nyla R Branscombe & John F Helliwell, 2019. "Prosocial perceptions of taxation predict support for taxes," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(11), pages 1-12, November.
    9. M A J van Hulsen & K I M Rohde & N J A van Exel, 2022. "Consideration of others and consideration of future consequences predict cooperation in an acute social dilemma: an application to COVID-19," Oxford Open Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1, pages 1-11.
    10. Shibly Shahrier & Koji Kotani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2017. "Intergenerational sustainability dilemma and a potential solution: Future ahead and back mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2017-9, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Aug 2017.
    11. William E. Shafer & Zhihong Wang & Tien-Shih Hsieh, 2020. "Support for Economic Inequality and Tax Evasion," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(19), pages 1-18, September.
    12. Frecknall-Hughes, Jane & Gangl, Katharina & Hofmann, Eva & Hartl, Barbara & Kirchler, Erich, 2023. "The influence of tax authorities on the employment of tax practitioners: Empirical evidence from a survey and interview study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    2. Kogler, Christoph & Batrancea, Larissa & Nichita, Anca & Pantya, Jozsef & Belianin, Alexis & Kirchler, Erich, 2013. "Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 169-180.
    3. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    4. Colin C. Williams & Friedrich Schneider, 2016. "Measuring the Global Shadow Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16551.
    5. Colin C. Williams, 2014. "Confronting the Shadow Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15370.
    6. Kaplanoglou, Georgia & Rapanos, Vassilis T., 2015. "Why do people evade taxes? New experimental evidence from Greece," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 21-32.
    7. Semjén, András, 2017. "Az adózói magatartás különféle magyarázatai [Various explanations for tax compliance]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 140-184.
    8. James Alm & Erich Kirchler & Stephan Muehlbacher, 2012. "Combining Psychology and Economics in the Analysis of Compliance: From Enforcement to Cooperation," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 133-152, September.
    9. Eric Floyd & Michael Hallsworth & John List & Robert Metcalfe & Kristian Rotaru & Ivo Vlaev, 2022. "What motivates people to pay their taxes? Evidence from four experiments on tax compliance," Natural Field Experiments 00750, The Field Experiments Website.
    10. Fochmann, Martin & Müller, Nadja & Overesch, Michael, 2018. "Less cheating? The effects of prefilled forms on compliance behavior," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 227, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    11. James Alm & Kim M. Bloomquist & Michael McKee, 2017. "When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects and Tax Compliance," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 38, pages 587-613, December.
    12. Kastlunger, Barbara & Lozza, Edoardo & Kirchler, Erich & Schabmann, Alfred, 2013. "Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 36-45.
    13. Cãƒtãƒlina Cozmei, 2012. "Playing The Fiscal Lottery Game," Proceedings of the INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 6(1), pages 511-521, November.
    14. Towfiqul Islam Khan & Muntaseer Kamal & Faiyaz Talukdar, 2019. "Potential of Personal Income Tax in Bangladesh: An Examination of Survey Data," CPD Working Paper 126, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD).
    15. Diana Onu & Lynne Oats, 2018. "Tax Talk: An Exploration of Online Discussions Among Taxpayers," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(4), pages 931-944, June.
    16. Christoph Kogler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, 2015. "Testing the “slippery slope framework” among self-employed taxpayers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 125-142, May.
    17. Koessler, Ann-Kathrin & Torgler, Benno & Feld, Lars P. & Frey, Bruno S., 2019. "Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 78-98.
    18. James Alm & Matthias Kasper, 2020. "Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 2008, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    19. Gobena, Lemessa Bayissa & Van Dijke, Marius, 2016. "Power, justice, and trust: A moderated mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 24-37.
    20. Nordblom, Katarina, 2017. "Tax Morale and Policy Intervention," Working Papers in Economics 711, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax compliance; Social value orientation; Tax morale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:50:y:2015:i:c:p:22-31. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.