Tax compliance inventory TAX-I: Designing an inventory for surveys of tax compliance
AbstractSurveys on tax compliance and non-compliance often rely on ad hoc formulated items which lack standardization, theoretical background, and empirical validation. We present an inventory to assess different intentions of compliance and non-compliance: voluntary versus enforced compliance, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. First, items eligible to differentiate between the intentions of compliance and non-compliance were collected from past research and newly developed, and tested empirically with the aim of producing four validated scales with a clear factorial structure. Second, findings from the first analyses were replicated and validated on the basis of motives of compliance and non-compliance, and on the basis of behaviour in a tax experiment. A standardised inventory is provided which can be used in surveys in order to collect data which are comparable across research focusing on self-reports. The inventory can be used in either of two ways: either in its entirety, or by applying the single scales independently, allowing an economical and fast assessment of different intentions underlying tax behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.
Volume (Year): 31 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep
Taxation Voluntary compliance Enforced compliance Tax avoidance Evasion Inventory;
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