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The impact of biased information and corresponding meta-information on escalating commitment

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  • Schultze, Thomas
  • Schulz-Hardt, Stefan

Abstract

Research on escalation of commitment suggests that decision-makers make use of additional information when confronted with a potentially losing course of action. Veridical information is a helpful tool when deciding whether to continue or de-escalate commitment. However, field data suggests that one primary source of information, namely information provided by experts, is often biased toward the continuation of projects. This bias is partly the result of attempts to influence decision-makers to escalate their commitment. Previous research has, so far, not addressed the question of how decision-makers in an escalation context utilize meta-information that makes them aware of such biases. In three experiments, we show that decision-makers act in accordance with expert advice: they further escalate their commitment when the experts suggest continuation of a failing project, and they de-escalate their commitment when the experts argue in favor of withdrawal (Experiment 1). When participants are made aware of the possibility that the expert advice is biased, the impact of this advice is reduced (Experiment 2). Most importantly, when decision-makers were made aware beyond doubt that the experts aimed to manipulate them, they also relied on the information less, but they failed to fully ignore it (Experiment 3). In sum, our data suggest that decision-makers in an escalation context are prone to attempts at manipulation as they cannot fully ignore biased advice even when the deceptive motive of their advisors is disclosed to them.

Suggested Citation

  • Schultze, Thomas & Schulz-Hardt, Stefan, 2015. "The impact of biased information and corresponding meta-information on escalating commitment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 108-119.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:49:y:2015:i:c:p:108-119
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.05.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ben Greiner, 2004. "The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics," Working Paper Series in Economics 10, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
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    5. McCarthy, Anne M. & Schoorman, F. David & Cooper, Arnold C., 1993. "Reinvestment decisions by entrepreneurs: Rational decision-making or escalation of commitment?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 9-24, January.
    6. Ben Greiner, 2004. "The Online Recruitment System ORSEE - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judgment and decision making; Sunk cost; Escalation of commitment; Deception; Social influence; Advice taking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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