This paper studies how the structure of markets in advanced countries is affected by the relocation of domestic firms to countries where wage costs are lower. We consider that private firms compete in the product market with firms partly owned by the government (semipublic firms). Assuming a mixed duopoly, we obtain the counterintuitive result that, for a certain range of values of the parameters of the model, in equilibrium, only the semipublic firm relocates. Moreover, if only one firm changes its location, social welfare is greater if it is the semipublic firm that relocates. J. Japanese Int. Economies 23 (1) (2009) 71-85.
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