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Reconsidering the moral hazard-risk avoidance tradeoff

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  • Newhouse, Joseph P.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 25 (2006)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1005-1014

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:25:y:2006:i:5:p:1005-1014

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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References

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  1. Pauly, Mark V. & Ramsey, Scott D., 1999. "Would you like suspenders to go with that belt? An analysis of optimal combinations of cost sharing and managed care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 443-458, August.
  2. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Incentives For Procrastinators," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 769-816, August.
  3. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, 2000. "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior," NBER Working Papers 7682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, 2001. "Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1261-1303, November.
  5. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2004. "Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1558-1590, December.
  6. Richard Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, 2004. "Save more tomorrow: Using behavioral economics to increase employee saving," Natural Field Experiments 00337, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Della Vigna, Stefano, 2003. "Contract Design and Self Control: Theory and Evidence," Research Papers 1801, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  8. Gerald S. Goldstein & Mark V. Pauly, 1976. "Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Good," NBER Chapters, in: The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector, pages 73-114 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
  10. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Doing It Now or Later," Discussion Papers 1172, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Miller, Nolan, 2005. "Health Benefits and Wages: Minimizing Total Compensation Cost," Working Paper Series rwp05-029, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  13. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
  14. Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, 2004. "Save More Tomorrow (TM): Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(S1), pages S164-S187, February.
  15. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
  16. Thaler, Richard H & Shefrin, H M, 1981. "An Economic Theory of Self-Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(2), pages 392-406, April.
  17. Jay Helms & Jospeh P. Newhouse & Charles E. Phelps, 1978. "Copayments and Demand for Medical Care: The California Medicaid Experience," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 192-208, Spring.
  18. Pauly, Mark V. & Held, Philip J, 1990. "Benign moral hazard and the cost-effectiveness analysis of insurance coverage," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 447-461, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2013. "Making Medicare advantage a middle-class program," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 463-473.
  2. Eline Aas, 2009. "Pecuniary compensation increases participation in screening for colorectal cancer," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(3), pages 337-354.
  3. Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, 2011. "Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare Spending Growth," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 47-68, Spring.
  4. Hai Zhong, 2010. "On decomposing the inequality and inequity change in health care utilization: change in means, or change in the distributions?," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 369-386, December.
  5. Michel Grignon & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2009. "Income and the Demand for Complementary Health Insurance in France," Working Papers DT24, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Apr 2009.
  6. Mark V. Pauly & Fredric E. Blavin, 2007. "Value Based Cost Sharing Meets the Theory of Moral Hazard: Medical Effectiveness in Insurance Benefits Design," NBER Working Papers 13044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Paula González & Nicolás Porteiro, 2009. "New perspectives in the design of pharmaceutical copayments," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2009/07, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  8. Pauly, Mark V. & Blavin, Fredric E., 2008. "Moral hazard in insurance, value-based cost sharing, and the benefits of blissful ignorance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1407-1417, December.
  9. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2012. "A welfare measure of “offset effects” in health insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(5), pages 520-523.
  10. Ellis, Randall P. & Manning, Willard G., 2007. "Optimal health insurance for prevention and treatment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1128-1150, December.

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