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Benign moral hazard and the cost-effectiveness analysis of insurance coverage

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  • Pauly, Mark V.
  • Held, Philip J
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8K-458WM21-15/2/60139e29048fee1fe032f24dbdd7f322
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (1990)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 447-461

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:9:y:1990:i:4:p:447-461

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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    Cited by:
    1. Eline Aas, 2009. "Pecuniary compensation increases participation in screening for colorectal cancer," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(3), pages 337-354.
    2. Basu, Anirban, 2011. "Economics of individualization in comparative effectiveness research and a basis for a patient-centered health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 549-559, May.
    3. Dana Goldman & Tomas Philipson, 2007. "Integrated Insurance Design in the Presence of Multiple Medical Technologies," NBER Working Papers 12870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Joseph Eisenhauer, 2006. "Severity of illness and the welfare effects of moral hazard," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 290-299, December.
    5. Mark V. Pauly & Fredric E. Blavin, 2007. "Value Based Cost Sharing Meets the Theory of Moral Hazard: Medical Effectiveness in Insurance Benefits Design," NBER Working Papers 13044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Pauly, Mark V. & Blavin, Fredric E., 2008. "Moral hazard in insurance, value-based cost sharing, and the benefits of blissful ignorance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1407-1417, December.
    7. Bradley Herring, 2010. "Suboptimal provision of preventive healthcare due to expected enrollee turnover among private insurers," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4), pages 438-448.
    8. Reza Yaesoubi & Stephen Roberts, 2010. "A game-theoretic framework for estimating a health purchaser’s willingness-to-pay for health and for expansion," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 358-377, December.
    9. Stanciole, Anderson, 2007. "Health Insurance and Life Style Choices: Identifying the Ex Ante Moral Hazard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-10, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD.

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