This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Benign moral hazard and the cost-effectiveness analysis of insurance coverage

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pauly, Mark V.
Held, Philip J
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8K-458WM21-15/2/60139e29048fee1fe032f24dbdd7f322
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 447-461
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:9:y:1990:i:4:p:447-461

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Eline Aas, 2009. "Pecuniary compensation increases participation in screening for colorectal cancer," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(3), pages 337-354. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dana Goldman & Tomas Philipson, 2007. "Integrated Insurance Design in the Presence of Multiple Medical Technologies," NBER Working Papers 12870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Joseph Eisenhauer, 2006. "Severity of illness and the welfare effects of moral hazard," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 290-299, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mark V. Pauly & Fredric E. Blavin, 2007. "Value Based Cost Sharing Meets the Theory of Moral Hazard: Medical Effectiveness in Insurance Benefits Design," NBER Working Papers 13044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stanciole, Anderson, 2007. "Health Insurance and Life Style Choices: Identifying the Ex Ante Moral Hazard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-10, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.