The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 87 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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