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On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard

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  • Phelan, Christopher
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5B88-2X/2/0e990044b1fa015666d9014ae6abeae1
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 79 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 174-191

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:79:y:1998:i:2:p:174-191

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Staff General Research Papers 5249, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Atkeson, Andrew & Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 427-53, July.
    3. Phelan, Christopher, 1994. "Incentives and Aggregate Shocks," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 681-700, October.
    4. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
    5. Wang, Cheng, 1995. "Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 577-95, October.
    6. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1990. "Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 367-390, August.
    7. Phelan Christopher, 1995. "Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 488-506, August.
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    Cited by:
    1. Espino, Emilio, 2005. "On Ramsey's conjecture: efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 192-213, April.
    2. Ivan Werning & Emmanuel Farhi, 2005. "Inequality, Social Discounting and Estate Taxation," 2005 Meeting Papers 358, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Ligon, Ethan, 2005. "Formal Markets and Informal Insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 75-88, March.
    4. Orazio P. Attanasio & Guglielmo Weber, 2010. "Consumption and Saving: Models of Intertemporal Allocation and Their Implications for Public Policy," NBER Working Papers 15756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Laurence Ales & Pricila Maziero, 2007. "Accounting for private information," 2007 Meeting Papers 804, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Larry E. Jones & Ali Shourideh & Roozbeh Hosseini, 2010. "Risk Sharing, Inequality, and Fertility," 2010 Meeting Papers 948, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Zhao, Rui R., 2007. "Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 601-640, September.
    8. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2013. "Market-based incentives," MPRA Paper 45576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Hosseini, Roozbeh & Jones, Larry E. & Shourideh, Ali, 2013. "Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: Family size and per capita consumption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1806-1840.
    10. Christopher Sleet & Sevin Yeltekin, . "Misery and Luxury: Long Run Outcomes with Private Information," GSIA Working Papers 2011-E19, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    11. Christopher Sleet & Sevin Yeltekin, 2006. "Credibility and endogenous societal discounting," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(3), pages 410-437, July.

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