Payoff continuity in incomplete information games: a comment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 120 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Feinberg, Yossi, 2000. "Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 127-179, April.
- Samet, Dov, 1998.
"Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 172-174, July.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
"Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games,"
1193R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kets, W., 2007. "Beliefs in Network Games (Replaced by CentER DP 2008-05)," Discussion Paper 2007-46, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kets, Willemien, 2011. "Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 300-325, January.
- Kets, W., 2008. "Beliefs in Network Games (Revised version of CentER DP 2007-46)," Discussion Paper 2008-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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