Nonmonetary sanctions and rewards in an experimental coordination game
AbstractA growing body of experimental research documents that nonmonetary sanctions and rewards may be important instruments for enforcing efficient behavior. This study contributes to this literature by reporting results from a laboratory experiment. The experiment is designed to test whether nonmonetary sanctions or rewards alone can yield the optimal level of efficiency in a game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Performance based disapproval and approval ratings, assigned by group members, are used as proxies for nonmonetary sanction and reward, respectively. Although these ratings are costless and payoff neutral, results show that expression of disapproval facilitates coordination on the most efficient equilibrium. In contrast, statement of approval induces subjects to converge towards the most inefficient outcome. We conclude that induced approval and disapproval ratings have asymmetric behavioral effects on coordination.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 73 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Coordination games Nonmonetary sanction Reward Experiment;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
- Akerlof, George A, 1980.
"A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June.
- George A. Akerlof, 1978. "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence," Special Studies Papers 118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007.
"When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory,"
Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September.
- Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CEEL Working Papers 0605, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
- Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp302, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Oliver Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2002.
"Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments,"
2002-29, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May.
- Olivier Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Working Papers 2005-09, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010.
"Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
- Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March.
- John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003.
"Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,"
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Post-Print halshs-00151423, HAL.
- Masclet, D. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M.C., 2001. "Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1141, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Noussair, C.N. & Masclet, D. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M..C, 2003. "Monetary and non-monetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377951, Tilburg University.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999.
"Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Working Paper Series 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007.
"Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
- Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0206, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- James M. Walker & Matthew A. Halloran, 2004. "Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 235-247, October.
- Van Huyck, John B. & Gillette, Ann B. & Battalio, Raymond C., 1992. "Credible assignments in coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 606-626, October.
- Knez, Marc & Simester, Duncan, 2001. "Firm-Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 743-72, October.
- Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick, 2002. "Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-27, April.
- Ananish Chaudhuri & Chenan Zhou & Parapin Prak & Laura Bangun, 2006. "Common and almost common knowledge of credible assignments in a coordination game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-10.
- Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental 0504003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2005.
- Rege, Mari & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1625-1644, July.
- Tor Eriksson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2012.
"Respect and relational contracts,"
- Lowen, Aaron & Schmitt, Pamela, 2013.
"Cooperation limitations under a one-time threat of expulsion and punishment,"
The Journal of Socio-Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 68-74.
- Aaron Lowen & Pamela Schmitt, 2011. "Cooperation limitations under a one-time threat of expulsion and punishment," Departmental Working Papers 33, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
- Fabrice Le Lec & Astrid Matthey & Ondrej Rydval, 2012. "Punishment Fosters Efficiency in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-030, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Timothy C. Salmon & Danila Serra, 2013.
"Does Social Judgement Diminish Rule Breaking?,"
Economics Series Working Papers
WPS/2013-05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- De Hoop, Thomas & Van Kempen, Luuk & Linssen, Rik & Van Eerdewijk, Anouka, 2010. "Women's Autonomy and Subjective Well-Being in India: How Village Norms Shape the Impact of Self-Help Groups," MPRA Paper 25921, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00800587, HAL.
- Matthias Greiff, 2013. "Affective Social Ties without the Need to Belong?," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 4(64), May.
- Quazi Shahriar & Subhasish Dugar, 2009. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: Role of Relative Label Salience," Working Papers 0033, San Diego State University, Department of Economics.
- Marianne Lumeau & David Masclet & Thierry Pénard, 2013. "Reputation and Social (Dis)approval in Feedback Mechanisms: An Experimental study," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201343, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.