Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Dynamic oligopoly with partial cooperation and antitrust threshold

Contents:

Author Info

  • Matsumoto, Akio
  • Merlone, Ugo
  • Szidarovszky, Ferenc

Abstract

A general framework of partial cooperation and shareholding interlocks in oligopolies is first introduced, and then the best responses of the firms are determined. The monotonic dependence of the equilibrium industry output on the cooperation levels of the firms is proved. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium which require sufficiently small speed of adjustments. Antitrust thresholds are then introduced into the model which may result in the loss of equilibrium or in the presence of multiple equilibria. The dynamic behavior of the associated dynamic models with adaptive output adjustments also becomes more complex: period-2 cycles may emerge and coexist with stationary states.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8F-4X7GM9K-1/2/75cc98c8c27cb3e26903a4fb14706476
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 73 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 259-272

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:2:p:259-272

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

Related research

Keywords: Oligopolies Partial cooperation Shareholding interlocks Antitrust threshold;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Berglof, Erik & Perotti, Enrico, 1994. "The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 259-284, October.
  2. Flath, David, 1991. "When is it rational for firms to acquire silent interests in rivals?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 573-583, December.
  3. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
  4. Yasuhiro ARIKAWA & Atsushi KATO, 2004. "Cross Shareholding and Initiative Effects," Discussion papers 04017, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  5. Reynolds, Robert J. & Snapp, Bruce R., 1986. "The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 141-153, June.
  6. Ugo Merlone, 2001. "Cartelizing effects of horizontal shareholding interlocks," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(6), pages 333-337.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:2:p:259-272

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.