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Settlement escrows: an experimental study of a bilateral bargaining game

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  • Babcock, Linda
  • Landeo, Claudia M.

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  • Babcock, Linda & Landeo, Claudia M., 2004. "Settlement escrows: an experimental study of a bilateral bargaining game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 401-417, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:53:y:2004:i:3:p:401-417
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gertner, Robert H & Miller, Geoffrey P, 1995. "Settlement Escrows," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 87-122, January.
    2. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.
    3. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, 1991. "Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 199-217, Summer.
    4. Babcock, Linda & Loewenstein, George & Wang, Xianghong, 1995. "The relationship between uncertainty, the contract zone, and efficiency in a bargaining experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 475-485, August.
    5. Smith, Vernon L, 1989. "Theory, Experiment and Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 151-169, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pecorino, Paul & Van Boening, Mark, 2015. "Costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 16-28.
    2. Pecorino Paul & Van Boening Mark, 2019. "Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 1-32, July.
    3. Eric Cardella & Carl Kitchens, 2017. "The impact of award uncertainty on settlement negotiations," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 333-367, June.
    4. Sean P. Sullivan, 2016. "Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric-Information Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 497-525.
    5. Landeo, Claudia & Nikitin, Maxim, 2015. "Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare," Working Papers 2015-11, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    6. Claudia M. Landeo, 2018. "Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments," Chapters, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler (ed.), Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, chapter 9, pages 247-268, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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