IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v166y2019icp28-52.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why not taxation and representation? British politics and the American revolution

Author

Listed:
  • Galiani, Sebastian
  • Torrens, Gustavo

Abstract

Why did the most prosperous colonies in the British Empire mount a rebellion? Even more puzzling, why did the British do not agree to have American representation in Parliament and quickly settle the dispute peacefully? At first glance, it would appear that a deal could have been reached to share the costs of the global public goods provided by the Empire in exchange for more political autonomy and/or formal representation for the colonies. (At least, this was the view of men of the time such as Lord Chapman, Thomas Pownall and Adam Smith.) We argue, however, that the incumbent government in Great Britain, controlled by the landed gentry, feared that giving political concessions to the colonies would undermine the position of the dominant coalition, strengthen the incipient democratic movement, and intensify social pressures for the reform of a political system based on land ownership. In particular, allowing Americans to be represented in Parliament was problematic because American elites could not credibly commit to refuse to form a coalition with the British opposition. Consequently, the only realistic options were to maintain the original colonial status or fight a full-scale war of independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Galiani, Sebastian & Torrens, Gustavo, 2019. "Why not taxation and representation? British politics and the American revolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 28-52.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:28-52
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119302720
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.024?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2009. "Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1078-1089, October.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
    3. Peter H. Lindert & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2016. "Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality since 1700," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10670.
    4. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    5. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
    7. Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth Lee Sokoloff, 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2002), pages 41-110, August.
    8. Smith, Adam, 1776. "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number smith1776.
    9. Gartzke, Erik & Rohner, Dominic, 2011. "The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 525-556, July.
    10. Galiani, Sebastian & Torrens, Gustavo, 2014. "Autocracy, democracy and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 173-193.
    11. Grossman, Herschel I & Iyigun, Murat F, 1997. "Population Increase and the End of Colonialism," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(255), pages 483-493, August.
    12. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1189.
    13. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    14. Gailmard, Sean, 2017. "Building a New Imperial State: The Strategic Foundations of Separation of Powers in America," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 111(4), pages 668-685, November.
    15. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 707-765.
    16. Thomas, Robert Paul, 1965. "A Quantitative Approach to the Study of the Effects of British Imperial Policy upon Colonial Welfare: Some Preliminary Findings," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 615-638, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2009. "Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1078-1089, October.
    2. Aguirre, Alvaro, 2016. "The risk of civil conflicts as a determinant of political institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 36-59.
    3. Sebastian Galiani & Gustavo Torrens, 2016. "Why Not Taxation and Representation? A Note on the American Revolution," NBER Working Papers 22724, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Zissimos, Ben, 2017. "A theory of trade policy under dictatorship and democratization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 85-101.
    5. Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy, 2017. "Guarding the Guardians," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(606), pages 2441-2477, November.
    6. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, 2018. "Path dependence and transitions from tyranny to democracy: evidence from ancient Greece," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 371-388, December.
    7. Kevin Sheedy & Bernardo Guimaraes, 2011. "A model of equilibrium institutions," 2011 Meeting Papers 49, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Bonfatti, Roberto, 2017. "The sustainability of empire in a global perspective: The role of international trade patterns," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 137-156.
    9. Nikolova, Elena & Nikolova, Milena, 2017. "Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 108-122.
    10. De Magalhaes, Leandro & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2022. "War and the rise of parliaments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    11. Terra Lawson-Remer, 2011. "Security of Property Rights for Whom?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2011-083, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. Cervellati Matteo & Fortunato Piergiuseppe & Sunde Uwe, 2012. "Consensual and Conflictual Democratization," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-51, December.
    13. Bernardo Guimaraes & Kevin D. Sheedy, 2017. "Guarding the Guardians," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(606), pages 2441-2477, November.
    14. Lawson-Remer, Terra, 2011. "Security of Property Rights for Whom?," WIDER Working Paper Series 083, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    15. Tommy Krieger, 2022. "Elites and Health Infrastructure Improvements in Industrializing Regimes," CESifo Working Paper Series 9808, CESifo.
    16. Iyigun, Murat, 2006. "Ottoman Conquests and European Ecclesiastical Pluralism," IZA Discussion Papers 1973, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    18. Michael K Miller, 2013. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 153-181, April.
    19. Verdier, Thierry & Bisin, Alberto, 2017. "On the Joint Evolution of Culture and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 12000, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Christopher Ellis & John Fender, 2016. "Information Aggregation, Growth, And Franchise Extension With Applications To Female Enfranchisement And Inequality," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 239-267, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    American revolution; Institutional change; Independence; Intra-elite conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:28-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.