Governance quality and privately negotiated stock repurchases: Evidence of agency conflict
AbstractThis study examines the impact of shareholder rights on the wealth effects of privately negotiated stock repurchases. Our results show that wealth gains are lower when shareholder rights are more suppressed. We also find that the premium paid for shares is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights, and this suggests that managers pay higher premiums when shareholder rights are more restricted. These findings imply that managers use shareholders' funds to eliminate blockholders who are more likely to monitor them when shareholder rights are relatively weak, thereby entrench themselves. Consistent with this view, we further show that significant positive abnormal long-run returns after private stock repurchases are limited to firms with stronger shareholder protection. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the predictions of agency theory.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.
Volume (Year): 33 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Privately negotiated stock repurchases Shareholder rights Agency conflict;
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