IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v114y2020ics0378426620300558.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Indications from a quasi-natural experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Abudy, Menachem (Meni)
  • Amiram, Dan
  • Rozenbaum, Oded
  • Shust, Efrat

Abstract

We find significant positive abnormal returns surrounding a surprising and quick enactment of a law that restricts executive pay to a binding upper limit in a few industries. We find that the effect is concentrated only for firms in which the restriction is binding. We also find that the increase in value is greater for firms with weaker corporate governance and smaller for firms that grant a greater portion of equity-based compensation to their executives. These results provide indications that, on average, compensation contracts can be set in a way that does not maximize firm value.

Suggested Citation

  • Abudy, Menachem (Meni) & Amiram, Dan & Rozenbaum, Oded & Shust, Efrat, 2020. "Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Indications from a quasi-natural experiment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:114:y:2020:i:c:s0378426620300558
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105787
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426620300558
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105787?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    2. Thanassoulis, John, 2014. "Bank pay caps, bank risk, and macroprudential regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 139-151.
    3. Rui Albuquerque & Luís Cabral & José Guedes, 2019. "Incentive Pay and Systemic Risk," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(11), pages 4304-4342.
    4. Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam & Weisbach, Michael S., 2011. "What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings," Working Paper Series 2011-19, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    5. Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim & Lauterbach, Beni, 1997. "Market microstructure and securities values: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 365-390, September.
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    7. Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The law and economics of self-dealing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 430-465, June.
    8. repec:fth:prinin:430 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    10. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, 2017. "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 23596, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Avner Kalay & Li Wei & Avi Wohl, 2002. "Continuous Trading or Call Auctions: Revealed Preferences of Investors at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 523-542, February.
    12. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    13. Sendhil Mullainathan & Marianne Bertrand, 2000. "Agents with and without Principals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 203-208, May.
    14. Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, 2010. "Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936--2005," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 2099-2138.
    15. James W. Kolari & Seppo Pynnönen, 2010. "Event Study Testing with Cross-sectional Correlation of Abnormal Returns," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(11), pages 3996-4025, November.
    16. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, 2003. "Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 1-41.
    17. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, April.
    18. Brian Cadman & Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J. Lynch, 2012. "Executive Compensation Restrictions: Do They Restrict Firms’ Willingness to Participate in TARP?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(7-8), pages 997-1027, September.
    19. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    20. Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Restricting CEO pay," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1200-1220, September.
    21. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    22. David L. Dicks, 2012. "Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(6), pages 1971-2004.
    23. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Agents with and without Principals," Working Papers 809, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    24. Menachem Meni Abudy & Avi Wohl, 2018. "Corporate Bond Trading on a Limit Order Book Exchange," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(4), pages 1413-1440.
    25. Dan Weiss, 2014. "Internal Controls in Family-Owned Firms," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 463-482, September.
    26. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    27. Viral V. Acharya & Paolo F. Volpin, 2010. "Corporate Governance Externalities," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-33.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Abudy, Menachem Meni & Gavious, Ilanit & Shust, Efrat, 2023. "Does adopting voluntary ESG practices affect executive compensation?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    3. Jiao Xue & Heng Fan & Zhanxun Dong, 2020. "Compensations of Top Executives and M&A Behaviors: An Empirical Study of Listed Companies," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-13, October.
    4. Abudy, Menachem (Meni) & Mugerman, Yevgeny & Shust, Efrat, 2022. "The Winner Takes It All: Investor Sentiment and the Eurovision Song Contest," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    5. Abudy, Menachem (Meni) & Mugerman, Yevgeny & Wiener, Zvi, 2021. "Stock markets and female participation in the labor force," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    6. Colonnello, Stefano & Koetter, Michael & Wagner, Konstantin, 2023. "Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dittmann, Ingolf & Maug, Ernst & Zhang, Dan, 2011. "Restricting CEO pay," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1200-1220, September.
    2. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
    3. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2014. "Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective," Cahiers de recherche 1406, CIRPEE.
    4. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
    5. Fernando Núñez & Ángel Arcos-Vargas & Carlos Usabiaga & Pablo Álvarez-de-Toledo, 2022. "On directors’ compensation: a multilevel analysis of Spanish listed companies," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 2173-2207, October.
    6. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "The State of Corporate Governance Research," Springer Books, in: Sabri Boubaker & Bang Dang Nguyen & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), Corporate Governance, edition 127, pages 325-346, Springer.
    7. Daniel Beck & Gunther Friedl & Peter Schäfer, 2020. "Executive compensation in Germany," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(5), pages 787-824, June.
    8. Palmberg, Johanna, 2012. "Family Control and Executive Compensation," Ratio Working Papers 186, The Ratio Institute.
    9. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
    10. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    11. Richard Heaney & Vineet Tawani & John Goodwin, 2010. "Australian CEO Remuneration," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 29(2), pages 109-127, June.
    12. Martijn Cremers & Yaniv Grinstein, 2009. "The Market for CEO Talent: Implications for CEO Compensation," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2385, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2009.
    13. Andreas Kuhn, 2010. "The Public Perception and Normative Valuation of Executive Compensation: An International Comparison," NRN working papers 2010-13, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    14. Godechot, Olivier & Horton, Joanne & Millo, Yuval, 2019. "Structural exchange pays off: Reciprocity in boards and executive compensations in US firms (1990-2015)," MaxPo Discussion Paper Series 19/1, Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo).
    15. Schymik, Jan, 2018. "Globalization and the evolution of corporate governance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 39-61.
    16. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    17. Chongwoo Choe & Gloria Tian & Xiangkang Yin, 2008. "Managerial Power, Stock-Based Compensation, And Firm Performance: Theory And Evidence," Monash Economics Working Papers 21/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    18. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Marinovic, Iván & Povel, Paul, 2017. "Competition for talent under performance manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-14.
    20. Faulkender, Michael & Yang, Jun, 2010. "Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 257-270, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive compensation; Governance; Optimal contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:114:y:2020:i:c:s0378426620300558. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.