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Qualitative information, reputation, and monopolistic competition

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  • Darby, Michael R.
  • Lott, John Jr.

Abstract

Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 87-103

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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:9:y:1989:i:1:p:87-103

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

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  1. Ohta, H, 1977. "On the Excess Capacity Controversy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 153-65, April.
  2. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  3. Schmalensee, Richard, 1972. "A Note on Monopolistic Competition and Excess Capacity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(3), pages 586-91, May-June.
  4. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  5. George J. Stigler, 1951. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59, pages 185.
  6. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1973. "Where Are We in the Theory of Information?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 31-39, May.
  7. Barzel, Yoram, 1970. "Excess Capacity in Monopolistic Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(5), pages 1142-49, Sept.-Oct.
  8. Michael R. Darby, 1973. "Entrepreneurships, the Firm, and the General Market Information Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 036, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
  10. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  11. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
  12. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Rothschild, Michael, 1973. "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1283-1308, Nov.-Dec..
  14. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-54, July/Aug..
  15. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  16. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby, 1995. "Social Construction of Trust to Protect Ideas and Data in Space Science and Geophysics," NBER Working Papers 5373, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Lynne G. Zucker & Michael R. Darby & Marilynn B. Brewer & Yusheng Peng, 1995. "Collaboration Structure and Information Dilemmas in Biotechnology: Organizational Boundaries as Trust Production," NBER Working Papers 5199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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