Specific and ad valorem tariffs are not equivalent in trade wars
AbstractThis note argues that when two countries choose optimal tariffs in a trade war, specific tariffs are not equivalent to ad valorem tariffs even if all markets are competitive. In particular, it shows that if a country's trading partener switches a specific tariff to an an valorem tariff that yields the same revenue at the initial trade point, the former country has an incentive to lower its tariffs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 52 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552
Other versions of this item:
- Kar-yiu Wong & Ben Lockwood, 1997. "Specific and Ad Valorem Tariffs are not Equivalent in Trade Wars," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0081, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Lockwood, B. & Wong, K.Y., 1996. "Specific and Ad Valorem Tariffs Are Not Equivalent in Trade Wars," Discussion Papers 9602, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Kar-yiu Wong & Ben Lockwood, 1997. "Specific and Ad Valorem Tariffs are not Equivalent in Trade Wars," Working Papers 0081, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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