Talking down the firm: Short-term market manipulation and optimal management compensation
AbstractThis paper analyzes the optimal use of short and long-term share prices in management incentive contracts. A key innovation of our model is that the short-term share price is determined even before the manager has made her effort choice and therefore cannot be informative in the standard principl-agent sense.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 16 (1998)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551
Other versions of this item:
- Garvey, G.T. & Grant, S. & King, S.P., 1996. "Talking Down the Firm: Short-Term Market Manipulation and Optimal Management Compensation," Papers 297, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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