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Sanctions in networks: “The Most Unkindest Cut of All”

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  • Joshi, Sumit
  • Mahmud, Ahmed Saber

Abstract

The extensive literature on sanctions has mainly focused on a dyadic interaction between sender and target. In contrast, this paper examines sanctions when the sender and target are embedded in a network of linkages to other agents. The sender can assemble a sanctioning coalition of neighbors to sever their links (execute multi-link cuts) to the target and her allies. Efficacy of sanctions is now crucially dependent on the network architecture. We characterize the structural properties of networks in which a sender can effectively sanction a target in the short run (when links can only be deleted) and the long run (when links can be both deleted and added).

Suggested Citation

  • Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2016. "Sanctions in networks: “The Most Unkindest Cut of All”," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 44-53.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:97:y:2016:i:c:p:44-53
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Joshi, Sumit & Mahmud, Ahmed Saber, 2018. "Unilateral and multilateral sanctions: A network approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 52-65.
    2. Sumit Joshi & Ahmed Saber Mahmud, 2017. "Unilateral and Multilateral Sanctions: A Network Approach," Working Papers 2017-28, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    3. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde & Jung, Euijin, 2020. "What's new in economic sanctions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multilateral sanctions; Sender; Target; Networks; Spanning trees; Cutsets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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