Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria
AbstractThe maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1995), who arrives at this result by computer enumeration, our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agents.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 26 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 1997. "Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria," Papers 300, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Ravi Kannan & Thorsten Theobald, 2010. "Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 157-173, January.
- Philip V. Fellman & Jonathan Vos Post, 2007. "Quantum Nash Equilibria and Quantum Computing," Papers 0707.0324, arXiv.org.
- McLennan, Andrew & Berg, Johannes, 2005. "Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 264-295, May.
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