IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v38y2010i2p840-849.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Long-term uncertainty evaluation of pool electricity markets

Author

Listed:
  • Álvarez López, Juan
  • Ponnambalam, Kumaraswamy

Abstract

Pool electricity markets are cleared under the strong assumption of having a perfectly known future; in real life, this is anything but true. The inability to predict the random parameters of the supply and the demand function introduces risk into the market clearing process. Therefore, the main interest is to minimize such risk by means of a trade-off of the mean and the variance of the social cost function. This paper considers random variations on the levels and on the slopes of the quadratic supply and demand functions. Correlation is considered between the corresponding coefficients of the supply and demand curves. By means of the mean-variance Markowitz theory, the risk introduced by these random variations is analyzed. A comprehensive analysis on the effects that the mean-variance Markowitz theory has on the nodal spot prices and on the point-elasticities of the supply and demand curves is made. The non-linear optimization model presented in this paper is validated through a three-, a six-, and a 21-node system.

Suggested Citation

  • Álvarez López, Juan & Ponnambalam, Kumaraswamy, 2010. "Long-term uncertainty evaluation of pool electricity markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 840-849, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:2:p:840-849
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301-4215(09)00779-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 233-264, June.
    2. Barmack, Matthew & Griffes, Peter & Kahn, Edward & Oren, Shmuel, 2003. "Performance Incentives for Transmission," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 9-22, April.
    3. Baron, David P, 1970. "Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 11(3), pages 463-480, October.
    4. Richard R. Nelson, 1961. "Uncertainty, Prediction, and Competitive Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 75(1), pages 41-62.
    5. Paul Joskow, 2006. "Patterns of Transmission Investments," Chapters, in: François Lévêque (ed.), Competitive Electricity Markets and Sustainability, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Harry Markowitz, 1952. "Portfolio Selection," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 7(1), pages 77-91, March.
    7. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Leonard J. Mirman & Egas M. Salgueiro & Marc Santugini, 2013. "Integrating Real and Financial Decisions of the Firm," Cahiers de recherche 1333, CIRPEE.
    2. Richard O’Neill & Emily Fisher & Benjamin Hobbs & Ross Baldick, 2008. "Towards a complete real-time electricity market design," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 220-250, December.
    3. Benjamin, Richard, 2013. "A two-part tariff for financing transmission expansion," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 98-107.
    4. Thomas-Olivier Léautier & Véronique Thelen, 2009. "Optimal expansion of the power transmission grid: why not?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 127-153, October.
    5. Asplund, Marcus, 2002. "Risk-averse firms in oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 995-1012, September.
    6. Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam, 2018. "Market Power Modelling in Electricity Market: A Critical Review," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 8(5), pages 347-356.
    7. Meunier, Guy, 2013. "Risk aversion and technology mix in an electricity market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 866-874.
    8. Guy Meunier, 2014. "Risk Aversion and Technology Portfolios," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(4), pages 347-365, June.
    9. Pepermans, Guido & Willems, Bert, 2010. "Cost Recovery in Congested Electricity Networks," Working Papers 2010/22, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    10. Varawala, Lamia & Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza & Dán, György & Bunn, Derek & Rosellón, Juan, 2023. "A pricing mechanism to jointly mitigate market power and environmental externalities in electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    11. E. Anderson & A. Philpott & H. Xu, 2007. "Modelling the effects of interconnection between electricity markets subject to uncertainty," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 65(1), pages 1-26, February.
    12. William Hogan & Juan Rosellón & Ingo Vogelsang, 2010. "Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 113-143, October.
    13. Larue, Bruno & Yapo, Vincent, 2000. "Asymmetries in risk and in risk attitude: the duopoly case," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(5), pages 435-453.
    14. Sauma, Enzo E. & Oren, Shmuel S., 2009. "Do generation firms in restructured electricity markets have incentives to support social-welfare-improving transmission investments?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 676-689, September.
    15. Horowitz, I. & Thompson, P., 1995. "The sophisticated decision maker: All work and no pay?," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-11, February.
    16. Bjørnebye, Henrik & Hagem, Cathrine & Lind, Arne, 2018. "Optimal location of renewable power," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 1203-1215.
    17. Joshua S. Gans, 2023. "Artificial intelligence adoption in a competitive market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(358), pages 690-705, April.
    18. Clemens Gerbaulet & Alexander Weber, 2014. "Is There Still a Case for Merchant Interconnectors?: Insights from an Analysis of Welfare and Distributional Aspects of Options for Network Expansion in the Baltic Sea Region," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1404, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    19. Stephen Littlechild, 2012. "Merchant and regulated transmission: theory, evidence and policy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 308-335, December.
    20. Rayati, Mohammad & Teneketzis, Demosthenis, 2022. "Electricity market design and implementation in the presence of asymmetrically informed strategic producers and consumers: A surrogate optimization-based mechanism," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:2:p:840-849. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.