This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Patterns of Transmission Investment

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Paul L. Joskow

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper examines a number of issues associated with alternative analytical approaches for evaluating investments in electricity transmission infrastructure and alternative institutional arrangements to govern network operation, maintenance and investment. The economic and physical attributes of different types of transmission investments are identified and discussed. Alternative organizational and regulatory structures and their attributes are presented. The relationships between transmission investments driven by opportunities to reduce congestion and loss costs and transmission investment driven by traditional engineering reliability criteria are discussed. Reliability rules play a much more important role in transmission investment decisions today than do economic investment criteria as depicted in standard economic models of transmission networks. These models fail to capture key aspects of transmission operating and investment behavior that are heavily influenced by uncertainty, contingency criteria and associated engineering reliability rules. I illustrate how the wholesale market and transmission investment frameworks have addressed these issues in England and Wales (E&W) since 1990 and in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in the U.S. since 2000. I argue that economic and reliability-based criteria for transmission investment are fundamentally interdependent. Ignoring these interdependencies will have adverse effects on the efficiency of investment in transmission infrastructure and undermine the success of electricity market liberalization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://tisiphone.mit.edu/RePEc/mee/wpaper/2005-004.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research in its series Working Papers with number 0504.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mee:wpaper:0504

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 77 Massachusetts Ave. (Building E40-279), Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
Phone: (617) 253-3551
Fax: (617) 253-9845
Email:
Web page: http://tisiphone.mit.edu/RePEc
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Sharmila Ganguly).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joskow, Paul L., 2005. "Transmission policy in the United States," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 95-115, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Richard O’Neill & Emily Fisher & Benjamin Hobbs & Ross Baldick, 2008. "Towards a complete real-time electricity market design," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 220-250, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomas-Olivier Léautier & Véronique Thelen, 2009. "Optimal expansion of the power transmission grid: why not?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 127-153, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hung-po Chao & Shmuel Oren & Robert Wilson, 2005. "Restructured Electricity Markets: Reevaluation of Vertical Integration and Unbundling," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000238, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Matsukawa, Isamu, 2006. "Regulating a Monopoly Offering Priority Service," MPRA Paper 991, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Isamu Matsukawa, 2009. "Regulatory effects on the market penetration and capacity of reliability differentiated service," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 199-217, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.