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Risk management and the stated investment costs by independent power producers

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  • Kashi, Bahman

Abstract

Evidence presented in this article suggests that in less developed countries the independent power producers (IPPs) have an incentive to overstate the investment cost as an instrument to mitigate the country risk in greenfield electricity generation projects. This technique is an effective risk mitigation strategy under the conventional financing and contractual arrangements in such markets. It, however, promotes the use of less efficient power plants. The distortion in the choice of technology results in economic losses over the life of the plants. The findings of this research have important policy implications that can assist regulatory bodies, governments, and international financing agencies to adopt a more informed approach to the integration of private investment into the electricity generation capacity of developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Kashi, Bahman, 2015. "Risk management and the stated investment costs by independent power producers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 660-668.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:49:y:2015:i:c:p:660-668
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.02.022
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    2. Baurzhan, Saule & Jenkins, Glenn P., 2016. "Off-grid solar PV: Is it an affordable or appropriate solution for rural electrification in Sub-Saharan African countries?," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1405-1418.
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    4. Koltsaklis, Nikolaos E. & Dagoumas, Athanasios S., 2018. "State-of-the-art generation expansion planning: A review," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 230(C), pages 563-589.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IPP; PPA; Privatization; Power generation; Electricity; Risk management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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