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Selfish routing in public services

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  • Knight, Vincent A.
  • Harper, Paul R.

Abstract

It is well observed that individual behaviour can have an effect on the efficiency of queueing systems. The impact of this behaviour on the economic efficiency of public services is considered in this paper where we present results concerning the congestion related implications of decisions made by individuals when choosing between facilities. The work presented has important managerial implications at a public policy level when considering the effect of allowing individuals to choose between providers. We show that in general the introduction of choice in an already inefficient system will not have a negative effect. Introducing choice in a system that copes with demand will have a negative effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Knight, Vincent A. & Harper, Paul R., 2013. "Selfish routing in public services," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 230(1), pages 122-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:230:y:2013:i:1:p:122-132
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.04.003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Young Hoon Lee & Yong Ho Choi, 2020. "Optimal cost adjustment for a selfish routing healthcare network," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 585-604, December.
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    4. Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Post-Print halshs-00983085, HAL.
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    6. Rob Shone & Vincent A. Knight & Paul R. Harper, 2020. "A conservative index heuristic for routing problems with multiple heterogeneous service facilities," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 92(3), pages 511-543, December.
    7. Panayides, Michalis & Knight, Vince & Harper, Paul, 2023. "A game theoretic model of the behavioural gaming that takes place at the EMS - ED interface," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1236-1258.
    8. Ghosh, Souvik & Hassin, Refael, 2021. "Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 295(1), pages 1-11.
    9. Meunier, Frédéric & Pradeau, Thomas, 2014. "The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(1), pages 245-256.
    10. Vincent Knight & Izabela Komenda & Jeff Griffiths, 2017. "Measuring the price of anarchy in critical care unit interactions," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 68(6), pages 630-642, June.
    11. Jessica L. Heier Stamm & Nicoleta Serban & Julie Swann & Pascale Wortley, 2017. "Quantifying and explaining accessibility with application to the 2009 H1N1 vaccination campaign," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 76-93, March.

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