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The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs

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  • Meunier, Frédéric
  • Pradeau, Thomas

Abstract

We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We are interested in the uniqueness property defined by Milchtaich (2005) as the uniqueness of equilibrium flows for all assignments of strictly increasing cost functions. He settled the case with two-terminal networks. As a corollary of his result, it is possible to prove that some other networks have the uniqueness property as well by adding common fictitious origin and destination. In the present work, we find a necessary condition for networks with several origin–destination pairs to have the uniqueness property in terms of excluded minors or subgraphs. As a key result, we characterize completely bidirectional rings for which the uniqueness property holds: it holds precisely for nine networks and those obtained from them by elementary operations. For other bidirectional rings, we exhibit affine cost functions yielding to two distinct equilibrium flows. Related results are also proven. For instance, we characterize networks having the uniqueness property for any choice of origin–destination pairs.

Suggested Citation

  • Meunier, Frédéric & Pradeau, Thomas, 2014. "The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(1), pages 245-256.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:237:y:2014:i:1:p:245-256
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2014.01.041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 315-330, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wan, Cheng, 2016. "Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 250(2), pages 531-542.
    2. Cheng Wan, 2016. "Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games," Post-Print hal-02885837, HAL.
    3. Jacquot, Paulin & Wan, Cheng, 2022. "Nonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many types," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 301(3), pages 1149-1165.

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