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The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust

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  • Neven, Damien J.
  • Roller, Lars-Hendrik

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the organisation of international antitrust as an issue of institution design which involves a trade-off between an inadequate internalisation of external effects across jurisdictions and the risk of capture in a centralised agency. We focus on the first element of the trade-off and on merger control. We first point out that the current framework of public international law allows for wide discretion in the assertion of jurisdiction. We then consider various allocation of jurisdictions in a stylised model of international merger control which attempts to capture the essential features of the objectives being pursued and of the procedures being implemented in the major jurisdictions. We find that in this framework, much of the scope for conflict disappears. The fact that conflicts actually often arise in global industries must then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust authorities are not supposed to pursue. We also find that the allocation of jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the final outcome.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 44 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4-6 (May)
Pages: 845-855

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:44:y:2000:i:4-6:p:845-855

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References

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  1. Keith Head & John Ries, 1997. "International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1104-23, November.
  2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March.
  3. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  4. Richardson, Martin, 1999. "Trade and Competition Policies: Concordia Discors?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 649-64, October.
  5. Horn, Henrik & Levinsohn, James, 2001. "Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 244-76, April.
  6. Barros, Pedro P. & Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Merger policy in open economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1041-1055, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Christian Wey, 2002. "Merger Control in the New Economy," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  2. Luis M. B. Cabral, 2003. "An Equilibrium Approach to International Merger Policy," Working Papers 03-25, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  3. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(01), April.
  4. Francesc Trillas, 2008. "Regulatory federalism in network industries," Working Papers 2008/8, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  5. Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "An Economic Perspective on the Jurisdictional Reform of the European Merger Control System," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200608, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  6. Neugebauer, Andrea, 2002. "Divergierende Fallentscheidungen von Wettbewerbsbehörden: Institutionelle Hintergründe," Arbeitspapiere 26, Westfälsche Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU), Institut für Genossenschaftswesen.
  7. Siroën, Jean-Marc, 2002. "Politique(s) de la concurrence dans une économie globale," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6628, Paris Dauphine University.
  8. Oliver Budzinski, 2006. "Modernisierung der europäischen Wettbewerbsordnung: Werden die nationalen Wettbewerbspolitiken verdrängt?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200611, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  9. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2003. "International merger policy coordination," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 21-30, January.

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