Limitations of dominance and forward induction: Experimental evidence
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 49 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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