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On the optimality of Treasury Bill auctions

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  • Menezes, Flavio M.

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  • Menezes, Flavio M., 1995. "On the optimality of Treasury Bill auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 273-279, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:49:y:1995:i:3:p:273-279
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    1. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
    2. Menezes, F.M., 1993. "Ascending-Price Multiple-Object Auctions," Papers 254, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    3. V. V. Chari & Robert J. Weber, 1992. "How the U.S. Treasury should auction its debt," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 16(Fall), pages 3-12.
    4. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    5. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    6. Henry Goldstein, 1962. "The Friedman Proposal for Auctioning Treasury Bills," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 386-386.
    7. Back, Kerry & Zender, Jaime F, 1993. "Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 733-764.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.
    2. Aliprantis, Charalambos D. & Tourky, Rabee & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2001. "A Theory of Value with Non-linear Prices: Equilibrium Analysis beyond Vector Lattices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 22-72, September.

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