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Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits

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  • Wu, Bin
  • Xu, Hanping

Abstract

A general condition called “coarser traits” is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of pure-strategy, Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria in a class of large games with traits.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Bin & Xu, Hanping, 2022. "Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001057
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110464
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2013. "Large games with a bio-social typology," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1122-1149.
    2. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808, Elsevier.
    3. He, Wei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2017. "Modeling infinitely many agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    4. Wei He & Yeneng Sun, 2018. "Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(2), pages 265-299, August.
    5. Haomiao Yu & Wei Zhu, 2005. "Large games with transformed summary statistics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 237-241, July.
    6. Rath, Kali P, 1992. "A Direct Proof of the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(3), pages 427-433, July.
    7. Fang, Chuyi & Wu, Bin, 2019. "Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 40-42.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coarser traits; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-undominated; Socially-maximal; Large games with traits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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