Large games with transformed summary statistics
AbstractThe existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is shown for a non-cooperative game with a continuum of small players and a compact action space. The players’ payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean of the transformed strategy profiles. This covers the case when the payoffs depend on players’ own actions and finitely many summary statistics. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (07)
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- Michael T. Rauh, 2006.
"Strategic Complementarities and Search Market Equilibrium,"
2006-01, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Rauh, Michael T., 2009. "Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 959-978, July.
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- Kolpin, Van, 2009. "Pure strategy equilibria in large demographic summary games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 132-141, July.
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