Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

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Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

Author Info

Levin, Dan
Harstad, Ronald M.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Ronald M. Harstad

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 20 (1986)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 315-319
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:20:y:1986:i:4:p:315-319

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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Harstad, Ronald M., 1991. "Asymmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 249-252, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0504, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0518, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
Fernando Branco, 1996. "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 283-309, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Documentos de Trabalho em Economia (Working Papers in Economics) 04, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto). [Downloadable!]
Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007. "Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ronald M. Harstad & Vlad Mares, 2005. "Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly," Working Papers 0515, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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