Compatibility, network effects, and collusion
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.031
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2020.
"Collusion between two-sided platforms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2018. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," TSE Working Papers 18-894, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2020.
- Yassine Lefouili & Joana Pinho, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," Post-Print hal-03167101, HAL.
- Kangsik Choi & DongJoon Lee, 2022. "Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(4), pages 461-471, December.
- Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2018. "Tacit collusion and its welfare effect in a network product market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 1787-1795.
- Wang, Wei & Lyu, Gaoyan, 2020. "Sequential product positioning on a platform in the presence of network effects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
- Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2017. "Collusion and welfare in the case of a horizontally differentiated duopoly with network compatibility," Discussion Paper Series 163, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jun 2017.
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2020.
"Collusion between two-sided platforms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2018. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," TSE Working Papers 18-894, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2020.
- Yassine Lefouili & Joana Pinho, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," Post-Print hal-02929298, HAL.
- Yassine Lefouili & Joana Pinho, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," Post-Print hal-03167101, HAL.
- Wu, Cheng-Han, 2019. "Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 840-853.
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More about this item
Keywords
Collusion; Compatibility; Network effect; Standard;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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