Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.005
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- Rupayan Pal & Marcella Scrimitore, 2016. "Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2016-010, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2020.
"Collusion between two-sided platforms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2018. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," TSE Working Papers 18-894, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2020.
- Yassine Lefouili & Joana Pinho, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," Post-Print hal-03167101, HAL.
- Fiaschi, Lorenzo & Cococcioni, Marco, 2021. "Non-Archimedean game theory: A numerical approach," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 409(C).
- Kangsik Choi & DongJoon Lee, 2022. "Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(4), pages 461-471, December.
- Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2018. "Tacit collusion and its welfare effect in a network product market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 1787-1795.
- Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2017. "Collusion and welfare in the case of a horizontally differentiated duopoly with network compatibility," Discussion Paper Series 163, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jun 2017.
- Xubei Lian & Kai Zhang & Leonard F. S. Wang, 2023. "Managerial delegation, network externalities and loan commitment," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 91(1), pages 37-54, January.
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2020.
"Collusion between two-sided platforms,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
- Lefouili, Yassine & Pinho, Joana, 2018. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," TSE Working Papers 18-894, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2020.
- Yassine Lefouili & Joana Pinho, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," Post-Print hal-02929298, HAL.
- Yassine Lefouili & Joana Pinho, 2020. "Collusion between two-sided platforms," Post-Print hal-03167101, HAL.
- Jen-Yao Lee & Chen-Chia Fan & Chien-Shu Tsai, 2023. "Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-11, March.
- Subrato Banerjee & Basri Savitha, 2021. "Competition reduces profitability: the case of the Indian life microinsurance industry," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 46(3), pages 383-398, July.
- Song, Ruichao & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2017. "Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 23-26.
- Pierre Cariou & Patrice Guillotreau, 2022. "Capacity management by global shipping alliances: findings from a game experiment," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 24(1), pages 41-66, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
Collusion; Market concentration; Network effects;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
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