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Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

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  • Sánchez, Marcelo

Abstract

Optimal delegation restores the beneficial effects of non-accommodating monetary policy when the central bank is allowed to be not fully transparent about its response to wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Sánchez, Marcelo, 2013. "Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 392-396.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:392-396
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Holden, Steinar, 2005. "Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 833-843, May.
    2. Fabrizio Coricelli & Alex Cukierman & Alberto Dalmazzo, 2006. "Monetary Institutions, Monopolistic Competition, Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 39-63, March.
    3. Fabio Canova & Evi Pappa, 2007. "Price Differentials in Monetary Unions: The Role of Fiscal Shocks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 713-737, April.
    4. Luca Gambetti & Evi Pappa & Fabio Canova, 2008. "The Structural Dynamics of U.S. Output and Inflation: What Explains the Changes?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(2‐3), pages 369-388, March.
    5. Spyromitros, Eleftherios & Zimmer, Blandine, 2009. "Monetary accommodation and unemployment: Why central bank transparency matters," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 119-121, February.
    6. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 67(s1), pages 1-35.
    7. David Soskice & Torben Iversen, 2000. "The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 265-284.
    8. Michael Woodford, 2001. "The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 232-237, May.
    9. Michael Woodford, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    10. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
    11. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hibbs Jr., Douglas A., 2008. "Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 134-156, March.
    12. Sánchez, Marcelo, 2011. "Monetary strictness and labour market outcomes under incomplete transparency," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 95-99, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wage setting; Central bank transparency; Monetary strictness; Optimal delegation; Calibration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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