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Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?

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  • Dukes, Anthony
  • Gal-Or, Esther
  • Geylani, Tansev

Abstract

Retailers and their suppliers often exchange demand information, which is believed to benefit both firms and consumers. We show how such information exchange can benefit only the upstream supplier at the expense of the downstream retailer and consumers.

Suggested Citation

  • Dukes, Anthony & Gal-Or, Esther & Geylani, Tansev, 2011. "Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 210-212, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:210-212
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Esther Gal-Or & Tansev Geylani & Anthony J. Dukes, 2008. "Information Sharing in a Channel with Partially Informed Retailers," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(4), pages 642-658, 07-08.
    2. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    3. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-343, March.
    4. Chuan He & Johan Marklund & Thomas Vossen, 2008. "—Vertical Information Sharing in a Volatile Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 513-530, 05-06.
    5. Lode Li, 2002. "Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(9), pages 1196-1212, September.
    6. Basar, Tamer & Ho, Yu-Chi, 1974. "Informational properties of the Nash solutions of two stochastic nonzero-sum games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 370-387, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cumbul, Eray, 2021. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    2. Long Gao & Birendra K. Mishra, 2019. "The Role of Market Evolution in Channel Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2432-2441, May.
    3. Ying Gao & Xiangpei Hu & Qingkai Ji, 2022. "Quality signaling strategies of experience goods in online–offline channel integration," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2967-2981, October.
    4. Brian Mittendorf & Jiwoong Shin & Dae-Hee Yoon, 2013. "Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 263-287, June.
    5. Bian, Junsong & Guo, Xiaolei & Lai, Kin Keung & Hua, Zhongsheng, 2014. "The strategic peril of information sharing in a vertical-Nash supply chain: A note," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 37-43.
    6. Huiqi Guan & Zhibin Yang & Haresh Gurnani, 2023. "Value of information with manufacturer encroachment," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(3), pages 780-793, March.
    7. Tran, Thanh & Desiraju, Ramarao, 2017. "Group-buying and channel coordination under asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(1), pages 68-75.
    8. Noam Shamir, 2017. "Cartel Formation Through Strategic Information Leakage in a Distribution Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, January.
    9. Aditya Jain, 2022. "Sharing Demand Information with Retailer Under Upstream Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4983-5001, July.
    10. Zhang, Jian & Nault, Barrie R., 2023. "Information sharing in an MTO supply chain with upstream adjustments," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 308(1), pages 97-112.
    11. Baojun Jiang & Lin Tian & Yifan Xu & Fuqiang Zhang, 2016. "To Share or Not to Share: Demand Forecast Sharing in a Distribution Channel," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 35(5), pages 800-809, September.
    12. Wei-Shiun Chang & Daniel A. Sanchez-Loor, 2020. "Downstream Information Leaking and Information Sharing Between Partially Informed Retailers," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 733-760, December.
    13. Brian Mittendorf & Jiwoong Shin & Dae-Hee Yoon, 2013. "Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 263-287, June.

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