The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments
AbstractThe first-order approach in rank-order tournaments is addressed. It is demonstrated that the conditions given in the literature are not sufficient to guarantee concavity of agents' objective functions. Additional conditions are provided that ensure validity of the first-order approach.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 111 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Rank-order tournaments First-order approach Concave objective function;
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